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A B S T R A C T
As demonstrated in this paper, Japan over the years has grown to become the leading ODA
provider in Central Asia (CA). ODA has served as a foreign policy tool and as the most sig-
niﬁcant tool for maintaining cooperation ties. Although the focus of Japan’s ODA assistance
over the years has been on East Asian countries, CA is growing to become another frontier
for more proactive Japanese policies.
The Japan-supported initiatives of recent years tend to favor more pragmatic cooper-
ation schemes. As is exempliﬁed by water-related assistance in Uzbekistan and support for
local capacity building in Kyrgyzstan, Japanese assistance of a more focused character can
better contribute to development both in these societies and in the region in general. These
types of initiatives can successfully complement government-to-government assistance
schemes and Japanese investments into large scale projects. The focus on local communi-
ties will also ensure that beneﬁciaries of the Japanese assistance projects will include not
only governmental institutions but also the general public at large.
Copyright © 2015 Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of Asia-Paciﬁc
Research Center, Hanyang University.
1. Introduction
Japan is searching for its own mode of engagement in
Central Asia. Japanese efforts to effectively engage CA coun-
tries started with the time of CA states’ independence,
including such initiatives as PM Ryutaro Hashimoto’s Eur-
asian (Silk Road) Diplomacy (1996–1997), Keizo Obuchi’s
mission to Eurasia even before he became PM, Junichiro
Koizumi’s Central Asia plus Japan Forum initiative (2004),
visit by PM Koizumi to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006,
Taro Aso’s initiative called Arc of Freedom and Prosperity
(2006) as well as CA tour of PM Shinzo Abe of October 2015
(Dadabaev, 2013, 2014; Rakhimov, 2014).
Japan’s standing in the region has strengthened signiﬁ-
cantly in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union
in that Japan has provided large contributions, both in terms
of Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) and ﬁnancial loans
to regional countries.1 However, there is an understanding
both in Japan and majority of Central Asian countries that
the potential for cooperation between Japan and Central
Asian countries is not being fully and properly realized. The
impact of its assistance and cooperation programs often falls
short of the expectations by Central Asian governments and
the general population.
What can Japan do to make its involvement and ODA as-
sistance in this region more effective? What are the factors
that inﬂuence these cooperation frameworks? These are the
questions that are examined in this paper.
This paper is divided into six main parts. First, it will de-
scribe how the Oﬃcial Development Assistance scheme
E-mail address: dadabaev@gmail.com.
1 For a number of recent examples, see Dukha (2007), Uzreport.com
Business Information Portal (2007), and Mamytova (2007). For a general
description and data, see Yagi (2007).
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came to become a tool of Japanese foreign policy. The second
part will then argue that Japan’s ODA was an important de-
velopmental tool for engaging CA countries. The third section
analyzes how Japanese engagement is perceived by the
general public in the region. For this purpose, the social
polling outcomes of the Asia Barometer for 2005 will be
compared with a similarly worded poll that was con-
ducted in 2015 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
to demonstrate the public expectations regarding Japa-
nese involvement in this region. The fourth part details the
Japan Human Development Center initiative as a pillar of
Japan’s human capacity development scheme. And the last
two sections focus on Japanese initiatives which beneﬁt both
governments and general public in Kyrgyzstan (One village–
One product program) and Uzbekistan (Water Users
Association support). This paper concludes by hypotheti-
cally suggesting more focused and narrower project-
based approaches to engaging CA countries for greater
eﬃciency in Japan’s involvement in CA.
2. ODA as a tool of cooperation in Japanese foreign
policy
In conducting bilateral andmultilateral cooperation, Japan
uses Oﬃcial Development Assistance as a tool that helps
Japan achieve its goals and simultaneously aims to assist
developing countries to achieve the tasks in their develop-
mental agendas (see Bobrow & Boyer, 1996; Orr, 1990;
Yasutomo, 1989-1990). Japan has grown from being a
country that was extended assistance in its post-WorldWar
II reconstruction to becoming a top donor to developing
countries in the 1990s. In Japan’s becoming such a donor,
the primary mission of the country’s assistance (aside from
its own interests) to developing nations was to offer both
ﬁnancial stimulus for development and a model of devel-
opment that would enable these countries to move from
the ranks of economic assistance recipients to the ranks of
countries that can sustain their development without ex-
ternal ﬁnancial assistance. Japanese interests were mainly
focused in Asian countries because Asia was conceptual-
ized as the region of primary interest to Japan. Therefore,
its ODA assistance has also been mainly channeled to Asian
countries (see Togo, 2005, p. 317). The composition of Japan’s
ODA assistance has long consisted of the ratio of 70% bi-
lateral aid to only 30% assistance channeled through
multilateral institutions. Many observers and practitio-
ners connect this ratio to the idea that the heavier emphasis
on bilateral aid works for both the donor and the recipi-
ent, presumably creating a better image for the donor
country and also offering a clearer picture of the donor cou-
ntry’s goals (Togo, 2005, p. 331; also see Bobrow & Boyer,
1996, pp. 105–6).
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs divides the ODA de-
velopment process into stages. The ﬁrst stage is classiﬁed
as system development, from 1954 to 1976, when the
system of overseas assistance was set in tandemwithWorld
War II reparations. The second stage dates from 1977 to 1991
and refers to systemic expansion, during which Japan as-
sisted with basic human needs and grassroots projects. The
third stage was the period of policy and philosophy en-
hancement, dating from 1992 to 2002, when the ODA charter
was adopted, which prioritized certain sectors for assis-
tance and identiﬁed multiple (bilateral, regional) levels of
assistance. This was the period when many policy makers
emphasized the need for qualitative changes that symbol-
ized moving away from simply providing large volumes of
ODA assistance to offering assistance that would make a dif-
ference in the development of Asian countries. The ﬁnal
period in ODA’s development is the period when the new
challenges (human security, peace maintenance, terror-
ism, etc.) appeared that required adopting the ODA schemes.
This period dates from 2003 to the present.2 The ODA charter
was also renewed during this period, emphasizing Japan’s
responses to newly arisen issues. This period also demon-
strated that as Japan attempted to adjust itself to new
challenges, it also attempted to redeﬁne its international
image under conditions when its economicmight wasweak-
ened (Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, &
Economic Co-operation Bureau, 2003).
The oﬃcial start date of Japan’s ODA is October 6, 1954,
when Japan became a part of the cooperation plan titled
the Colombo Plan, the ﬁrst agreement of which concluded
with India in 1958.3 In addition, theWorldWar II defeat also
had consequences for Japan in that it was obliged by the
San Francisco Peace Treaty to pay reparations for postwar
reconstruction and development to the Asian countries that
sought these payments. Some of these reparations were paid
in services and goods from the Japanese government, which
had an impact on the way ODA assistance schemes were
structured in the following years. In particular, some of the
aid assistance was referred to as “tied” assistance and re-
ferred to the recipient’s obligation to purchase Japan-
produced goods and services as a part of the assistance
package (Togo, 2005, p. 320). In 1957, Prime Minister Kishi
reaﬃrmed Japan’s commitment to improving its ties with
neighboring countries and assisting these countries to
improve their welfare. In addition, it was assumed that this
move would to lead to developing Japan’s economy
(Matsuura, 1981). In the years when Japan’s economy re-
corded high economic growth, the country established an
agency that was primarily responsible for supervising Japan’s
assistance and cooperation, namely, the Japan Internation-
al Cooperation Agency (JICA), in 1974. JICAwas chargedwith
supervising and implementing technical cooperation and
grant assistance. Prime Ministers including Tanaka and
Fukuda also maintained high levels of ODA assistance to
Asian countries. This culminated in the adoption of the so-
called Fukuda doctrine in 1978, which pledged full support
for ASEAN countries and signiﬁcant ﬁnancial assistance
(Yasutomo, 1989-1990, p. 492).
In 1978, Japan also announced a plan to double its ODA
in three years in the First Medium-Term ODA Target. During
PM Ohira’s administration, the government announced its
2 For theMFA’s periods of classiﬁcation, refer toMinistry of Foreign Affairs
of Japan (n.d.).
3 The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Develop-
ment in Asia and the Paciﬁc was conceived at the Commonwealth
Conference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) in
January 1950 and was launched on 1 July 1951 as a regional intergovern-
mental organization that would further the economic and social
development of the peoples of South and Southeast Asia; see
http://www.colombo-plan.org/history.php.
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intention to play a more proactive role in multilateral in-
ternational institutions and deﬁned foreign aid as a major
instrument for achieving this task. Since then, every PM of
Japan has entertained the idea of Japan’s becoming “an active
creator” (Bobrow & Boyer, 1996, p. 101). At the end of the
1970s, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) deﬁned Japan’s
interests in providing ODA using rhetoric on the impor-
tance of interdependence and preserving peace and stability.4
The use of Japanese economic aid has been limited to non-
military purposes, and Japan has attempted to compensate
for its inability to contribute to international efforts through
military means by providing economic assistance to the
countries in conﬂict-prone regions (Yasutomo, 1989-1990,
p. 494). In 1988, the Takeshita administration announced
increased Japanese ODA assistance (Yasutomo, 1989-1990,
p. 491). This increase implied diversifying ODA recipients
and expanding regional representation in the Japanese as-
sistance programs. This meant including larger countries in
the Middle East, Africa, South America and Oceania while
Asia still remained the main area of Japan’s ODA focus.
Therefore, gradually, Japan’s ODA assistance gradually
became a tool of Japan’s foreign policy representation
overseas.
In the mid-1990s, as if to reﬂect on the economic stag-
nation in Japan’s economy, the country’s government
considered reducing ODA economic aid. PM Hashimoto ﬁrst
announced reducing aid by 10% and called for additional
reductions and the need to reconsider the impact of eco-
nomic aid for Japan’s economy.
Furthermore, in the years after 2000, the government of
PM Koizumi reconsidered the ODA charter while more
strongly emphasizing the importance of Japanese inter-
ests in proving ODA assistance. The new ODA charter also
called for increased eﬃciency in Japan’s assistance schemes,
which was important for both Japanese taxpayers and ODA
recipients abroad.
Japan’s ODA is structurally divided into bilateral andmul-
tilateral assistance provided to developing nations. The
bilateral assistance is normally granted by the Japanese
government to the governments of developing nations and
is categorized into grants-in-aid with no interest rate, tech-
nical assistance aid or grants-in-aid to NGOs. In most cases,
this assistance is administered by the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA). Although Japan’s assistance to
developing countries is decreasing because of the cou-
ntry’s slow economic growth, it still remains among the
world’s leading powers that offer assistance to developing
countries.
There are three main categories of Japanese ODA assis-
tance that are extended to receiving countries. As was
mentioned above, these are yen-based loans and grants, no-
interest grants-in-aid and technical assistance.
The purpose of yen-denominated loans is to support eco-
nomic and social infrastructure development in the receiving
country. These loans have frequently been requested and
used by receivers to construct airports, electricity-generating
stations, and dams. In terms of social infrastructure devel-
opment, these loans have been used to ﬁnance medical
development projects as well as underground water infra-
structure development and education projects.
No-interest grants-in-aid have been mostly used in the
least developed countries in the ﬁelds of medicine, poverty
eradication, agricultural development and provision of basic
human needs.
The projects that have received no-interest grants-in-
aid in Central Asia and the Caucasus have been mostly
related to these ﬁelds as well as to education and human
development.
Technical assistance projects mostly consist of those
that involve dispatching experts in a particular ﬁeld from
Japan to a receiving country to build that country’s foun-
dations of expertise in strategically important ﬁelds. In
addition, these types of funds have also been used to train
various specialists in both recipient countries and Japan,
and these funds have also been used to fund in-depth studies
of certain challenges faced by ODA receiving countries to
identify the underlying causes of these problems and es-
tablish strategies for resolving them. In the region of CA
and the Caucasus, these funds have been used to send Jap-
anese experts to CA as well as to support legal, medical,
energy and agricultural infrastructure development proj-
ects and to support the activities of Japan centers in the
region (Table 1).
4 In 1978 MOFA published “The Current State of Economic Coopera-
tions and its Outlook: The North-South Problem and Development
Assistance” and in 1980 “The Philosophies of Economic Cooperation: Why
Oﬃcial Development Assistance,” see Togo (2005, p. 334).
Table 1
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member-states’ assistance to countries of Central
Asian and Caucasus.
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Japan 172.57 (1.7) 92.73 (1.3) 228.17 (3.9) 163.78 (2.4) 212.56 (3.4)
US 361.46 (1.4) 468.66 (2.2) 556.20 (2.9) 1016.64 (4.3) 844.16 (3.4)
UK 25.61 (0.3) 31.72 (0.4) 35.01 (0.6) 49.55 (0.7) 32.35 (0.4)
France 17.35 (0.2) 37.28 (0.5) 34.94 (0.6) 52.59 (0.8) 59.10 (0.8)
Germany 176.22 (2.4) 157.51 (2.2) 215.31 (2.7) 249.36 (2.8) 289.51 (4.1)
Italy 3.74 (0.2) 0.29 (0.0) 0.42 (0.0) 6.50 (0.4) 3.55 (0.4)
Canada 15.12 (0.5) 10.79 (0.4) 15.39 (0.5) 10.37 (0.3) 4.54 (0.1)
Sweden 15.76 (0.7) 30.92 (1.2) 41.21 (1.4) 53.76 (1.7) 38.57 (1.3)
The percentage of assistance to CA countries in the overall assistance offered to all countries is in parentheses.Source: Compiled from the data made avail-
able by theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2011 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu chiiki) [Oﬃcial Development Assistance
By-country Data-book 2011 (Region of Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/
kuni/11_databook/pdfs/03-00.pdf (last accessed on April 18, 2012).
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3. Japanese ODA and Central Asia
In the ﬁrst years following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Japan indicated a considerable long-term commit-
ment to helping Central Asian nations in their ﬁrst steps of
nation-building. These were conducted within the frame-
work of various Japanese initiatives in CA such as Eurasian
Diplomacy (1996–1997), CA plus Japan initiative (2004) and
Arc of Freedom and Prosperity (2006) (Dadabaev, 2013). The
assistance projects of the most signiﬁcant impact were in
the ﬁelds of humanitarian relief, infrastructure develop-
ment and technical assistance, which are partly based on
grant allocations and partly on policies to generate eco-
nomic opportunity. These are the much-needed projects for
providing equipment (PCs, projectors, etc.) for local edu-
cational institutions, making educational grants, and granting
technical assistance to agricultural producers, to name only
a few. The achievements of Japanese engagement in CA are
often considered striking and unquestionable, in terms of
their necessity, their grant totals, and the number of proj-
ects conducted.5 Japan has also contributed to the CA
development through a substantial ﬁnancial support for
projects ranging from infrastructure development related
to the transport of goods and services, to tourism (Table 2).6
Japan has implemented a range of projects designed to
improve people’s standard of living through community de-
velopment and support programs in themost impoverished
parts of the country. The primary purpose of these programs
was to empower local communities andenhance their proﬁt-
generating capacity in areas thatwere historically developed
in those communities, as documented in Japanese Inter-
nationalCooperationAgency (JICA)documents (Proekt, 2011).
Such programs were based on amodel introduced in Japan
itself, namely, “one village–one product” (Isson Ippin). The
main purpose of these activities is to identify the capacity
of each participating community and a product each com-
munity produces thatmay enjoy signiﬁcantmarket demand.
This process is typically advanced through a cooperation and
co-funding scheme between JICA and local governments. As
a rule, the Japanese provide short-term training, informa-
tionondistribution techniques, and someﬁnancial assistance
to facilitate production of an advantageous product that has
the potential to generate proﬁts and employment in each
community. In the period since independence, several dozen
Kyrgyz communities have been involved in these types of
grass-roots assistance programs. Examples include the fa-
cilitation of rare-herb collection and marketing, honey
production and distribution, and the development of local
craft workshops. The schemes in the Issuk-kul Oblast (Prov-
ince) of Kyrgyzstan are particularly well known.
In other cases, Japan provided much needed assistance
for Water Users Associations and their formation as de-
scribed in the sections below, using partly the case of
Kyrgyzstan and heavily building on empirical data of
Japanese involvement in Uzbekistan.
Japanese ODA is instrumental in all of the economic de-
velopment and humanitarian projects.7 The Japanese
government deﬁnes as the primary purposes of ODA5 For an interesting analysis and outline of the achievements of Japa-
nese policy in Central Asia, see Yagi (2007, pp. 13–16).
6 Japan primarily provided assistance with modernizing infrastructure
such as airports and related facilities. Some of these transportation fa-
cilities remain ineﬃcient and largely underused; see Ibragimov (2008).
7 For details on Japanese ODA and changes to it, see Söderberg (2002).
Also, see Furuoka (2007).
Table 2
Central Asian countries’ exports/imports to and from Japan.
(a)
Country Trade Japanese companies
in the country
Export to Japan Import from Japan Balance
2013 (in million yen) 2013 (in million yen) 2013 (in million yen)
Uzbekistan 12,252.78 12,931.94 −679.16 –
Kazakhstan 66,627.27 83,969.40 −17,342.14 8
Kyrgyz Republic 116.37 11,348.08 −11,231.71 –
Tajikistan 101.32 193.25 −91.93 –
Turkmenistan 7.37 4,703.36 −4,696.00 –
(b)
Country Trade Japanese companies
in the country
Export to Japan Import from Japan Balance
2013 (in million US dollars)a 2013 (in million US dollars)a 2013 (in million US dollars)a
Uzbekistan 9.88 10.4 −0.54 –
Kazakhstan 53.73 67.71 −13.98 8
Kyrgyz Republic 0.1 9.15 −9.05 –
Tajikistan 0.81 1.55 −0.74 –
Turkmenistan 0.05 3.79 −3.74 –
aCurrent rate for calculation is 124 Yen = 1 US dollar.Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu
Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu chiiki) [Oﬃcial Development Assistance By-country Data-book 2014 (Region of Central
Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/ﬁles/000072593.pdf (last accessed on July 15, 2015).
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disbursements the following: humanitarian assistance, in-
creasing the economic interdependence of different markets,
and bolstering environmental preservation. The main prin-
ciples for disbursement eschewed the use of ODA formilitary
purposes or to promote conﬂict. Instead, it was primarily
aimed at economic development, with an emphasis on en-
vironmentally friendly, sustainable development models;
enhancing peace and stability around the world and to
contain and prevent the development of weapons of mass
destruction; and promoting democratization, the transi-
tion to market economies, and respect for human rights in
the recipient countries (Tables 3 and 4).
Nonetheless, several cautionary lessons can be drawn
from Japan’s involvement in the CA region. First, on the basis
of previous Japanese economic and humanitarian engage-
ment, one can conclude that the improper identiﬁcation of
ﬁelds of cooperation will cause Japanese involvement to be
ineﬃcient, irrespective of the volume of ﬁnancial re-
sources devoted to such projects. In addition, Japanese
engagement seems to have a larger and more signiﬁcant
impact in the region when it aims to assist in developing
local capacities, as opposed to emergency or short-term hu-
manitarian assistance schemes. Capacity building (in forms
that generate beneﬁts for individuals to an equal extent to
those enjoyed by governments) implies empowering local
populations to generate wealth. Therefore, improving local
capacities for societal development is more eﬃcient, because
this approach also implies a degree of sustainability after
Japanese assistance ends. Humanitarian assistance proj-
ects of the type Japan has provided (technical, medical, etc.)
largely duplicate those run by international or national
organizations.8
There seems to be an understanding within JICA and
other aid agencies of the Japanese government that prior-
ity should go to projects that ideally help establish
production or service cycles that local actors will be
able to maintain on their own.9 Moreover, the projects
currently underway in the region reﬂect Japan’s limited
resources and a mutual awareness of the need to support
initiatives that cannot be managed by local governments
and non-governmental institutions alone.10
4. Expectations of Central Asia’s general public toward
Japan
On par with Japan’s interests in the region, Central
Asian leaderships and public societies have considerable
expectations for Japan. In particular, leaders of regional
countries would like to see the Japanese government more
actively encourage direct investment by Japanese corpora-
tions and companies, especially in the ﬁelds of energy
resource development and the transportation of these re-
sources. In this sense, the interests of regional countries
and their Japanese counterparts coincide in that both sides
want to see an intensiﬁcation of business and trade ties.
Additionally, there is an expectation of Japanese support
through the Central Asia plus Japan scheme for strength-
ening regional integration, creating a common market in
the region, and promoting regional cooperation in water
management. In return for Japan’s assistance, the leaderships
of Central Asian countries have continuously and consis-
tently expressed their support for Japan’s bid for permanent
UN Security Council membership and joined in support-
ing Japanese concerns about the situation on the Korean
peninsula.
These expectations from Central Asian leadership for
Japan contrast with the general public’s confused attitude
toward Japanese initiatives in the region. On the one hand,
8 Author’s ﬁeld research ﬁndings during the “Survey on Agricultural and
Rural Development based on Population Issues” in 2003 with the Asian
Population and Development Association (APDA). Some results of the survey
(without the interviews cited in this article) are available in printed form
in Japanese and English. For the English-language version, see Asian
Population and Development Association (APDA) (2003) and Asian
Population and Development Association (APDA) (2002).
9 In an interview with a Japanese Embassy oﬃcial in a Central Asian
country, the author was informed that current Japanese government policy
regarding the provision of technical assistance is that contracts are granted
on a competitive basis. Local contractors are given the same privileges as
Japanese contractors. It was also emphasized to the author that local con-
tractors are preferred in certain situations, because using local suppliers
makes providing technical assistance easier and more sustainable in the
long term. The only concern in this case is that local contractors are fre-
quently not completely familiar with the documentation procedures and
proper formalities for participating in tenders for contracts and they do
not always have the capacity to provide the necessary equipment. This in-
adequacy puts foreign-based and Japanese companies in a better position,
resulting in the situation referred to in the paper. Author’s personal com-
munication, Embassy of Japan, March 2008.
10 One example of these projects is the support for and training of the
members of the Water Users’ Associations in Uzbekistan. For details, see
JICA materials on Mizu Kanri Kaizen Projekto [Improvement of the Water
Management Project] (Tashkent: JICA, 2011). The project is still active.
Table 3
Japanese ODA offered to the countries of Central Asia on a bilateral basis by country (in million US dollars).
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Uzbekistan 30.92 40.16 63.22 99.75 60.02 29.60 70.29 64.53 41.92 34.08 31.26 26.25 56.49
Kazakhstan 43.93 30.13 136.27 134.34 69.68 28.19 55.39 56.63 63.38 30.56 19.79 30.89 36.99
Kyrgyz Republic 23.15 8.12 31.23 26.69 20.95 17.22 15.69 12.49 18.06 23.50 30.99 19.98 17.87
Tajikistan 4.61 26.96 4.77 6.58 9.93 8.04 9.43 8.06 26.24 43.42 35.59 32.98 26.66
Turkmenistan 16.42 11.37 6.80 2.22 0.13 0.62 0.38 0.57 1.15 1.55 1.27 0.53 0.56
Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuou
ajia/kokasasu chiiki) [Oﬃcial Development Assistance By-country Data-book 2014 (Region of Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/ﬁles/000072593.pdf (last accessed on July 15, 2015).
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Japanese involvement is accompanied by relatively signif-
icant public support among populations in Central Asia. In
autumn 2005, the University of Tokyo conducted the Asia
Barometer poll throughout Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, 40
percent of respondents thought that Japan has had a good
or rather good inﬂuence on their country (10.4 percent, good;
30.3 percent, rather good).
In Uzbekistan, the numbers who considered Japanese in-
ﬂuence to be good or rather good stood at 52.2 percent (15.9
percent and 36.3 percent, respectively) (Figs. 1–4).11
However, Russia received ratings of 80 percent good or
rather good in Kazakhstan (38.9 percent and 41.1 percent,
respectively), and in Uzbekistan, Japan ranked third after
Russia (56.8 percent and 34.1 percent) and South Korea
(28.6 percent and 40.1 percent). These higher ratings can
be attributed to Russia’s proximity and historical linkages
and the large resident minority groups of Russians and
Koreans in Central Asia. In addition, aggressive Korean
industrial and business expansion in the region, increas-
ing labor migration to Russia and increasing economic
ties with China have added to the popularity and aware-
ness of Central Asian countries about contributions to
their economic development from countries other than
Japan.
Nevertheless, in 2015, a similar poll conducted by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan found that CA can be
considered a Japan-friendly region, with the majority of its
population feeling strong or relative closeness to Japan, as
seen in Figure 5.
When asked what makes people feel close to Japan, the
responses mainly centered around notions of Japan’s being
attractive because of its level of economic development, its
culture and the high quality of goods produced there, as seen
in Figure 6. Additionally, the country’s long Asian history
and its certain rules and cultural traditions that compared
with those in CA also contributed to the feeling that there
was closeness between Japan and CA.
Among the qualities that attract the general Central
American public toward Japan and the Japanese people, the
majority of those who were asked highlighted personal
qualities such as the Japanese being polite, neat in work,
punctual and responsible as the primary image of the
country (Figs. 6 and 7).
Mainly because of this sympathy toward Japan, the ma-
jority of respondents considered their countries’ relations
with Japan to be good (Uzbekistan 79%, Tajikistan 56%,
Kyrgyzstan 52%, and Kazakhstan 59%) or rather good
(Uzbekistan 13%, Tajikistan 24%, Kyrgyzstan 23%, and
Kazakhstan 42%). Such views may represent awareness of
the current state of affairs and also reﬂect wishful think-
ing and the respondents’ desires to consider their countries
as being Japan-friendly (Fig. 8).
Although extensive Russian inﬂuence in the region is un-
derstandable and to some extent even unavoidable, the
11 For the results of the Asia Barometer project regarding Central Asia,
see Dadabaev (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). For the full 2005 data set,
see Inoguchi (2008). For the 2003 data set, see Inoguchi, Basanez, Tanaka,
and Dadabaev (2005).Ta
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Fig. 1. What is the inﬂuence of the following countries on Kazakhstan (2005)?
Fig. 2. What is the inﬂuence of the following countries on Uzbekistan (2005)?
What is the influence of the following
countries on Kyrgyzstan (2005)?
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Fig. 3. What is the inﬂuence of the following countries on Kyrgyzstan (2005)?
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strong performances of China and South Korea and their
popularity not only among the leadership but also among
the general public can primarily be explained not through
their historical ties but largely through their economic
expansion into the region and their contribution in gener-
ating economic wealth and lifting the population’s living
standards. A number of plants that produce products
ranging from automobiles to electric devices and house-
hold appliances throughout the region have made a large
impact on the public’s perception of these countries
(Figs. 9, 10).
What is the influence of the  following
countries on Tajikistan (2005)?
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Fig. 4. What is the inﬂuence of the following countries on Tajikistan (2005)?
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feel closeness 50 73 49 49
relatively feel closeness 37 13 25 15
Fig. 5. Do you feel closeness to Japan?
Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go
.jp/mofaj/ﬁles/000076282.pdf.
Method: Subcontracted polling conducted by Business Information, Social
and Marketing Research Center (BISAM) and Central Asia Company in
respect to 1200 people 18 years and older in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
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Fig. 6. Why do you feel closeness to Japan?
Kazakhstan Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan
Effective 56 53 58 42
Polite 20 16 17 19
Collective-oriented 15 5 17 21
Honest and trustworthy 15 9 22 16
Fig. 7. What do you think of the Japanese people?
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Fig. 8. How do you evaluate your country’s relations with Japan at this
moment?
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The Japanese competitive advantage in comparison with
Russia, China and other countries is that it is considered to
be impartial and that Japanese motivations to enter CA are
not connected to the neocolonial images of Russia or China.
Because of its distance from the region and the general image
of the Japanese as beingmore honest and punctual and gen-
erally contributing to CA development, the mood among the
general public toward Japan is more welcoming and friend-
ly, as demonstrated by the following answers to a recent
survey (Figs. 11, 12, 13).
Despite these expectations of the general public and the
welcoming attitude toward Japanese business, the pene-
tration into CA by these companies has been slow. The
reasons for this slow penetration primarily rest with CA gov-
ernments because they have been slow and not suﬃciently
ﬂexible to provide proper legal protection to foreign inves-
tors, establish mitigation mechanisms and enact laws
regarding economic activities.
However, there are also additional factors behind the
low level of Japanese economic penetration, namely, the
hesitancy of Japanese businesses, which can be explained
by the slow decision-making processes in Japanese
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Fig. 10. Which country do you think is going to be the most important
partner for your country?
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Fig. 12. Would you welcome the entrance of Japanese companies into your
country?
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Fig. 9. Which country do you think is currently themost important partner?
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Fig. 13. Among the listed areas, which are the ones to which you would
like Japan to contribute to develop your country and region?
32 T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
corporate culture and government agencies, a lack of
relevant information, and the CA countries’ lack of the
type of infrastructure Japanese companies typically expect
when they invest abroad. This assessment is supported
not only by scholars but also by career diplomats who
are actively involved in implementing Japan’s CA policy
(Kawato, 2008, p. 16). This slow penetration has meant
training an excessivenumber of individuals in the Japa-
nese language, but the limited employment opportunities
eventually produced doubts about the usefulness of this
type of education and spurred a decrease in interest. One
result was a vicious cycle for these programs because the
low eﬃciency levels and decreasing numbers of students
together discouraged Japanese authorities from beginning
new programs, often leading them to question the need
for Japan-focused or Japan-initiated programs in the CA
region.12
As was indicated in the previous section, the capacity
development initiatives of the Japanese government serve
as a good background for assisting Japanese companies to
enter CA markets. As was explained in the section on
Japan centers, these training centers and language courses
were initially established to bolster Japanese initiatives by
encouraging local leaders to support, among other goals,
more intensiﬁed economic interactions. However, the lack
of economic ties between Japan and these states and the
hesitancy on the Japanese side (in both economic circles
and the government) to play more active roles in this
region make the political and cultural initiatives incom-
plete. PM Abe during the tour of CA in October of 2015
attempted to encourage Japanese businesses to partici-
pate in CA economies as well as to secure support for
them from CA governments.
This again brings to light the importance of redeﬁning
the ﬁelds and how Japan participates in the region’s
development. Functionalist approaches may be useful in
further enhancing Japan’s standing in the region. Such
thinking might help Japan in formulating regional pene-
tration policies with higher degrees of effectiveness and
that would have a greater impact on the lives of the
general population. Such support for a more focused ap-
proach to supporting CA capacity building can be seen in
the PM Abe-announced support, during his visit to CA
in 2015, for several educational initiatives like those in
Turkemistan on the Japanese participation in a buld-up of
Japan-supported University and in Uzbekistan on estab-
lishment of Youth Innovation Center to be sponsored and
run jointly by Japan and Uzbekistan. The examples of the
Japanese assistance through Japan Centers, through OVOP
initiative in Kyrgyzstan and Water Users Association in
Uzbekistan can be representative of the kind of activities
which are expected of Japan and which beneﬁt CA general
public.
5. Japan Human Resource Development Centers as
human capacity development tool
Another case involves Japan-initiated educational
programs. The education provided by Japanese institu-
tions is a very important part of the capacity-building
process. One of the pillars of Japan’s educational activities
in theregion is the Japan Human Resource Development
Centers in these countries, which provide Japanese lan-
guage classes and classes on Japan’s expertise in business
development and which assist local educational institu-
tions in providing Japanese education and language
training.
In addition, the promotion of cultural interactions among
the general public was considered a step toward smoother
political, economic, and social cooperation between Japan
and its CA counterparts. One tool for fostering this mutual
understanding was establishing cultural centers and reg-
ularly holding cultural events in Japan and CA to introduce
the cultures of these societies to one another. Just as certain
Japanese educational institutions focus their studies on CA,
the Japanese government established Japan Centers for
Human Development and supported Japanese Studies de-
partments across CA. These were tasked with introducing
Japanese culture and fostering the development of Japan-
friendly attitudes among future policy makers and
practitioners in the region.
A typical example is the center established in Tashkent
in August 2001. The Japan Center for Human Develop-
ment in Uzbekistan was established based on an agreement
between the governments of Uzbekistan and Japan that
concluded in October 2000. The main purpose of this center
is to enhance mutual understanding and strengthen friend-
ly relations between the two countries through
communicating a variety of information and introducing
the culture and language of Japan. The center’s activities
focus on Japanese language courses and assistance to various
institutions in language training. In addition, another im-
portant facet is business courses that include Japanese
trainers with certain backgrounds and experience in cor-
porate environments who are speciﬁcally invited from Japan
to teach these courses. Other activities include computer
literacy classes for those with disabilities, including the
deaf and hearing impaired, events promoting cultural ex-
change with the participation of Japanese center staff, such
as book sales, classes in Shodo, open seminars, ﬁlm dem-
onstrations, exhibition of toys from all corners of Japan,
classes on ikebana, origami and karaoke, tea ceremonies,
digital camera use, Japanese cuisine, and playing tradition-
al instruments. Similar activities are held in Japan centers
established within university premises in Almaty and
Bishkek.
The creation of the Japan centers was often in contrast
to the similar institutions created by other countries that
were interested in increasing their “soft-power” potential.
These are exempliﬁed by China’s Confucius Institute,
German’s Goethe Institute, the British Council and other
similar organizations. Although the essence of these insti-
tutions’ activities may differ to some extent, their essential
goals are the same, representing their respective cultures
and countries and creating positive images tied to their
12 During an evaluation hearing on the Special Program for Central Asian
countries at the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science Sports and Tech-
nology, the committeemembers questioned the necessity of such programs
conducted in Central Asia, September 2011.
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national interests. It should be noted that the Japan centers’
Japanese courses became an important tool for increasing
the number of peoplewhowere proﬁcient in Japanese, some
of whomwere later recruited to become language trainers
and teachers.
These centers often offer language training, an intro-
duction to Japanese culture, and vocational training. The
latter primarily focuses on business management courses
and promoting small- and medium-scale entrepreneurship.
At the center in Tashkent, the admission is competitive: three
times as many individuals apply as there are available spots.
This is signiﬁcant, especially because those who are admit-
ted must pay a rather high fee of US$800–$1000 for a ﬁve-
month course. These classes have produced 140 graduates
per year, totaling nearly 800 people.13
The centers have been very successful in their ﬁrst decade
of operation, with the numbers of CA students ﬂuent in
Japanese, working for Japanese businesses, and attending
Japanese universities spiraling to unprecedented levels. Since
the center in Tashkent was established, the average number
of monthly visitors (including both those who enrolled in
center courses and those who visited it to use the library
and PC/video equipment) increased from 2331 in 2001 to
5933 in 2011. The average number of visitors per year in-
creased from 4662 in 2001 to a peak of 74,045 in 2007,
which decreased to 62,395 visitors in 2010 but still remains
high.14
In addition, the number of people in CA societies who
regard Japan as contributing to their countries’ develop-
ment grew to the extent that Japanwas considered a leading
country in this respect, as demonstrated in the survey data
in the next section of this paper. This evidence again dem-
onstrates that Japan’s commitment to promoting mutual
understanding with the people of CA has had a positive
impact, thus contributing to developing Japanese soft power
in these societies.
However, Japan faces certain challenges in promoting
its culture and language in CA. The ﬁrst concerns the impact
of the Japan Centers for Human Development, which has
experienced a decline in public interest in recent years as
exempliﬁed in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Although
Japan actively established and promoted the centers and
similar institutions for many years, the applicability of
the information received at these institutions is increas-
ingly being questioned. This has arisen because Japanese
companies and institutions that represent Japanese eco-
nomic interests in CA are not yet as numerous as those
from other countries (China, South Korea, etc.).15 There-
fore, the opportunities for the graduates of the Japan centers,
Japanese language departments, and business courses to
apply their knowledge while working with the Japanese
business community are rather limited. As noted above,
Japanese foreign policy goals in CA and the region’s signif-
icance for Japan are poorly deﬁned, which is another factor
that is slowing Japan’s economic and political penetration
there. As a result, many graduates of Japanese language
departments and courses at the Japan centers have ended
up in local tourism industries, which beneﬁted from an
increase in Japanese tourism in the initial years following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. The graduates went to
Japan to receive their education and found employment
there or were forced to look for unrelated jobs. Those who
were educated in Japan often found themselves overquali-
ﬁed for local work, as exempliﬁed by medical doctors who
were trained in Japan and then had to work in poorly
equipped CA clinics.
6. Japan’s “one village–one product” initiative in
Kyrgyzstan
The issue of supporting community-based initiatives has
always ranked high on the agenda of international donor
institutions due to the assumption that support to the com-
munities would have a direct impact on the well-being of
the population. In this regard, Japan has also implemented
a number of projects aiming to provide empowerment to
people at the community level to have a direct opportuni-
ty to improve the livelihoods of people. As mentioned above,
one such project is the “one village–one product” assis-
tance scheme in Issyk region of Kyrgyzstan, which is an
ongoing project.
The role of JICA in the process of implementing the
OVOP has been a complicated one. On the one hand, it
was the task of JICA to encourage and facilitate the process
of creating OVOP participating groups. On the other hand,
it was also the task of JICA not to over-patronize partici-
pants so that participants feel a sense of responsibility for
the outcomes of this project. In addition, the ﬁnal aim of
JICA was to accomplish the task of making these groups
self-sustainable after the end of the project.
The role of JICA in this project, therefore, was limited
to the following functions. First, JICA provided ﬁnancial
assistance necessary for setting up the production cycle.
Second, JICA organized training that was deemed neces-
sary for people who have never had any experience in
organizing production on their own. Third, JICA also pro-
vided training for marketing skills and an initial marketing
study for those who considered starting their own produc-
tion so that these individuals could learn about the potentials
of establishing such productions cycles and groups. For
those intending to launch a production of felt products,
there was a special training devoted to the issues of pro-
duction and packaging of such products. Additional training
was devoted to improving the quality of the products.
These trainings were supervised by the instructors dis-
patched from Japan. All of the trainings were conducted
in the locations where the production cycles were to be
established, providing both expertise and practical advice.
JICA also assisted members in negotiating the possibility
of selling their products in the shops in Bishkek and other
areas.
13 Figures are based on information provided during the author’s inter-
view with a high-ranking oﬃcial at the Japan Center for Human
Development in Tashkent on May 26, 2011.
14 Figures are based on information provided during the author’s inter-
view with a high-ranking oﬃcial at the Japan Center for Human
Development in Tashkent on May 26, 2011.
15 Centers exist in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Almaty (Kazakhstan) and
Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan).
34 T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
OVOP implementation chart
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Source: “Yapon El Aralyk Kyzmattashuu Agenttigi”, 2010; further modiﬁed by Akbermet Nurmanbetova (2012).
In terms of management of the OVOP scheme, JICA’s
counterpart in this project was the administration of the
Issyk Kul region. For the purposes of managing this project,
JICA published a manual for prospective and current
members, which explained the purposes of the OVOP im-
plementation not merely as an economic enterprise but also
as a community-building initiative, which is expected to lead
to conﬁdence building and enhancing initiative among com-
munity members through joint economic activity.
The initial mission to deﬁne the needs and importance
of such a project was launched in 2003 in Kyrgyzstan in co-
operation with the State Commission on Architecture and
Construction and the State Service of Geodesy and Cartog-
raphy under the title “The Study on Integrated Development
Plan of Issyk-Kul Zone.” The study was conducted from 2003
to 2006 and aimed to reveal the prospects for developing
the Issyk Kul region’s potential in terms of both tourism and
sustainable community development (JICA, 2006). As a
result, this study developed a proposal in which four main
areas were identiﬁed as crucial for sustainable develop-
ment of the Issyk Kul region. These four areas were
community empowerment, agricultural rehabilitation and
recovery, development of touristic potential and invest-
ment, and safeguarding environmental security.
Among these four areas, the one targeting community
empowerment was identiﬁed as a priority area for Japa-
nese ODA support. Assistance to this initiative was extended
under the overall goal of assisting economic growth-
generating projects and was launched in 2006.
Introduction of the OVOP scheme in Kyrgyzstan was not
a conceptually new practice for JICA. Prior to Kyrgyzstan,
this scheme of community empowerment has been intro-
duced in other countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam and
Cambodia. Initially, the OVOP was a scheme practiced in the
Oita prefecture in Japan. The main idea of the OVOP scheme
is that communities would receive assistance in enhancing
their capacity to produce, develop andmarket products that
they can successfully develop to generate proﬁt and sustain
their community life.
In rural Kyrgyzstan, the issue of providing support to pro-
ducers in remote areas with non-existent or weak producer
associations and poor infrastructure and to local residents
in encouraging them to ﬁnd and develop a product that
would allow them to successfully sustain their lives is crucial
(JICA, 2006). Therefore, this project attempted to organize
members of certain communities in the Issyk Kul area into
producers of certain goods for which local environment or
traditions serve as competitive advantage (JICA, 2006).
After the ﬁrst steps of the project were completed and
these groups launched their products, 60 more groups were
added as participants in the project. At the follow-up stage
to the ﬁrst phase of the project, the process of developing
an Issyk Kul brand was launched. The brand was regis-
tered with the national authority for brand registration, and
its product line was expanded to include not only jams and
dried fruits but also products from leather, wood and stone.
In addition, to promote exports of these products, JICA con-
ducted a competition among the OVOP projects conducted
internationally. As a result, the OVOP projects from Kyr-
gyzstan and Kenyawere selected as partners for the Japanese
brand Muji, enabling them to merchandise their products
using Muji’s network (Ryohin Keikaku Co., Ltd). In 2011,
during the MUJI Christmas Market event alone, OVOP pro-
ducers received orders for 10,000 items produced in
Kyrgyzstan. Since 2011, such events have been taking place
annually.
The second phase of the OVOP project in Kyrgyzstan is
designed to last from January 2012 to 2015 with the par-
ticipation of 60 groups that participated in the ﬁrst phase
of the project. If successful, this example might lead to
further enlargement of the project to include more partici-
pating members. In some unsuccessful cases, however, the
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project members left the OVOP project after they lost further
interest in it.
7. Japanese support to the Water Users Association
(WUA) building strategy
One of the main points in the agenda of reforming an
agricultural sector is the issue of how to address buying and
selling land, which are prohibited in Uzbekistan largely
because of the unresolved issue of water privatization. One
of the initiatives undertaken to address these issues in Uz-
bekistanwas the creation ofWater Users Associations, which
were initially government-subsidized, as an alternative to
government-runwater-distribution schemes. These schemes
remain under heavy government control, but they are now
more accessible to local water consumers, offer larger self-
governance incentives for local agricultural producers and
involve a higher level of local community participation in
the alleviation of water shortages. The overall aim is to de-
crease water consumption in several stages. The ﬁrst stage
would be accomplished through a reduction of unproduc-
tive water losses (which currently cause at least 20% of the
total water uptake). A later stage would be accomplished
through higher technologically advanced forms of irriga-
tion, which require an improvement of ﬁnancial capacities
of both the Government and water users (Dukhovnyi, 2003,
p. 17).
The ﬁnal goal of creating Water Consumers Associa-
tions is two-fold. First, it is to reduce the level of water
consumption. Second, this measure is not simply to provide
agricultural producers with water but rather to create an
institution through which local producers themselves can
facilitate their own effective consumption and accumula-
tion of excess water and accomplish the task of enriching
their own land.
By helping establish such a system, Japan aimed to stim-
ulate local agricultural producers to use less water and at
the same time reduce the burden of governmental control
over this sector of agriculture.
One of the main problems of such associations is that
they are critically under-funded. Small and medium-sized
agricultural producers such as farmers or dehkans are not
yet able to cover all of the costs related to the installation
of new technology, maintenance and extension of existing
water networks. They do not draw suﬃcient proﬁt from their
production to make investments in the water distribution
network. As a result, these associations are effective in using
existing water distribution networks but are not self-
reliant because they still receive funding from the
government.
The joint Uzbek–Japanese project aimed to improvewater
management, starting with the pilot WUAs in the target
areas, by improving the training systems within the Basin
Irrigation System Management (BISM) and the Irrigation
Systems Department. As part of the project, the appropri-
ate technologies for water distribution and maintenance of
irrigation and drainage facilities were designated to be dis-
seminated to the pilot WUAs.
What was intended within the project was ﬁrst to
strengthen the training system for WUAs in locations in
which farmers have never experienced this type of system
of water management. Second, the project attempted to
strengthen the capacity of WUA staff members. Third, the
projected attempted to provide expertise not only for WUA
operations but also for maintaining the irrigation and drain-
age facilities that were overlooked in the years after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
The project started with the Tashkent Region (under
Chirchik-Ohangaran Basin Irrigation System Manage-
ment), the Syrdarya Region (under Lower Syrdarya BISM)
and the Djizak Region (under Lower Syrdarya BISM). Japan
committed to a 300 million Yen investment for these ac-
tivities, providing 4 experts who were dispatched for long-
term assignments and 6 experts who were dispatched for
short term assignments to oversee these activities. The
Japanese government also delivered equipment worth 70
million Yen and provided for local operation costs worth
110 million Yen and operational costs of 7 million Yen
(161,825,000.00 Uzbek Som), exclusively for oﬃces and
facilities at the Project Oﬃce at Tashkent and oﬃces and
facilities for pilot WCAs.
The Japanese engagement, which aimed to develop grass
roots capacity building for WUAs, has had both achieve-
ments and shortcomings. First, the evaluation of the outputs
of the project indicated that although the indicators set at
the beginning of the training have been achieved, the ca-
pabilities of BISM and ISD staff have not yet been satisfactory
to the point of being able to run a WUA sustainably and in-
dependently. In terms of tangible outcomes, the Project has
developed training modules for the improvement of tech-
nical and managerial skills of WCAs, with 7 textbooks and
3 additional manuals in addition to preparing a number of
trainers. Although the training was conducted in 194 train-
ing sessions and attended by a cumulative total of 570 staff
of the pilot WUAs, the extent to which these individuals can
apply their knowledge must be further assessed.
Second, the training for water measurement was suc-
cessfully conducted, with participants learning how to
monitor water allocations and register water supplies for
their respective WUAs. However, when checked for com-
pliance with the training criteria for keeping records, many
of those who attended training did not keep the proper
forms once they returned from training to their duties, thus
necessitating further supervision of proper record keeping
of water supplies in the cropping season.
Third, the training provided expertise in how to make
plans for irrigation and drainage maintenance and repairs.
Although at the level of training, the majority of those par-
ticipating displayed a fair level of ability to draft and properly
deﬁne irrigation and drainage facilities repairs and main-
tenance, these plans were properly implemented only in a
limited number of cases. Nine of the 27 plans for canal
repairs were actually implemented and completed. Eight
plans were only partially implemented, and 10 canals were
left completely unattended.
Fourth, the goal of capacity building for maintenance of
WUA functioning was partially achieved. The indicators
of the collection rate of water and other service fees and
of the implementation of water distribution could not fully
reach the deﬁned targets due to logistical problems related
to the non-implementation of irrigation and drainage
facilities.
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Although the outcome’s success was limited, the overall
effect and importance of these activities can be character-
ized as very high because this project provided expertise
to farmers that has never before been available to them. In
addition, the indirect effect of the project is that the ex-
pertise provided to farmers is projected to be transmitted
to those who were not part of the training by word of the
mouth, thus multiplying the effect of the training.
There have also been positive effects from the Project on
the agricultural production and economic conditions of the
farmer beneﬁciaries and on the reduction of salinity prob-
lems. There have been positive changes in terms of the
organizational and ﬁnancial aspects of the pilotWCAs. Social
changes were also noted by the beneﬁciaries, such as in-
creased trust in WCAs by the members, closer relationships
with ISD oﬃcials, and favorable recognition by and in-
creased support from local authorities such as khokimiyat.
Spontaneous diffusion of technologies such as ﬂume repair
to other WCAs in the vicinity was also reported. Thus, a
highly positive effect is expected from the Project. In fact,
there was no negative effect of the Project reported or ob-
served as of the time of the Evaluation.
8. Conclusion
As demonstrated in this paper, Japan over the years has
grown to become the leading ODA provider in Central Asia.
ODA has served as a foreign policy tool and as the most sig-
niﬁcant tool for maintaining cooperation ties. Although the
focus of Japan’s ODA assistance over the years has focused
on East Asian countries, CA is growing to become another
frontier for more proactive Japanese policies.
As described above, a number of Japanese initiatives have
in general brought positive development to CA and are highly
valued by the CA public. This appreciation is transmitted
both at oﬃcial meetings and also frequently at the ordi-
nary public level, as indicated by public survey data from
2005 and from 2015. Yet as seen from respondents’ answers,
there is tremendous potential for Japanese penetration into
the CA region, primarily through cultural and economic di-
plomacy. Unfortunately, this potential is not yet being used
to accomplish this task. In this regard, more focused, tar-
geted, functional approaches might hypothetically assist in
making the Japanese engagement in CA more eﬃcient and
result oriented.
The potential areas of cooperation both within the region
and with partners from outside of the region include stimu-
lating economic development, resource development and
utilization, and water-management policies and strate-
gies. These areas in particular are considered to impact the
long-term economic sustainability and interstate security
in CA.
The Japan-supported initiatives also tend to emphasize
narrower, more speciﬁc approaches to cooperation both
with and in Central Asia. As was outlined above, these
primarily include cooperation in energy resource
transportation and production as well as support for
community-based water, educational and sustainable
development-related projects. This is also a clear move in
favor of more pragmatic cooperation in this region. As is
exempliﬁed by water-related assistance in Uzbekistan and
support for local capacity building in Kyrgyzstan, Japa-
nese assistance of a more focused character can better
contribute to development both in these societies and in
the region in general. These types of initiatives can suc-
cessfully complement government-to-government assistance
schemes and Japanese investments into large scale proj-
ects. The focus on local communities will also ensure that
beneﬁciaries of the Japanese assistance projects will include
not only governmental institutions but also the general
public at large.
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